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Abstract We analyse the state of the art in the field of life cycle portfolio choice,
a recent strand of the literature on intertemporal portfolio selection. Life cycle mod-
els are designed to identify optimal savings and portfolio policies over the lifetime
of investors. They can help to improve pension schemes by showing how these could
be specifically tailored to the individual employee’s circumstances to overcome the
‘one-size-fits-all’ philosophy still prevailing in parts of the mandatory retirement
savings system. To facilitate comparison, we first describe set-up, solution method
and characteristic results for a basic model and then derive a general framework to
classify existing contributions. We highlight the models’ strengths and weakness-
es and assess their ability to resolve existing portfolio puzzles. Lessons from the
literature are summarized and promising areas for further research identified.
Keywords Personal finance · financial planning · life cycle model · portfolio
choice
JEL classifications G11, D14, D91, H55
1 Introduction
Young people and families in European countries are nowadays aware of the fact
that they have to privately accumulate savings if they want to preserve their standard
of living after retirement. The investment horizon of these households is necessarily
long-term, and the investment period extends across different stages in their life
cycle. Under these circumstances, it is not intuitive to set up an optimal investment
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and consumption strategy. This article reviews the stream of literature which models
investment and consumption with special regard to the life cycle of investors.
The standard portfolio theory introduced by Markowitz (1952) is static in na-
ture, since it explores investment decisions for only one period. A more realistic
setting must account for the multiperiod dimension of the portfolio choice prob-
lem. Only under very specific circumstances, the optimal portfolio structure is
time invariant. In this special case, a one-period optimization suffices to charac-
terize the optimal portfolio choice also in a multiperiod environment. Under more
general conditions, however, investors will restructure their portfolios in reaction to
changes in income, the accumulated wealth and the investment opportunity set. This
possibility to adjust the portfolio composition affects the initial investment choice.
From the perspective of investors saving for retirement, the portfolio choice
problem changes dramatically during the life cycle. Popular wisdom holds that
early in working life, a typical investor should invest almost all of her wealth in
stocks as opposed to the risk-free asset. When approaching retirement, the investor
should gradually decrease the share of stocks in order to reduce the impact of
disastrous losses since these could no longer be offset by increased savings out of
labor income.1
Life cycle models of portfolio choice are designed to provide a more detailed
and more comprehensive analysis of optimal investment policies. Their general
set-up can be characterized as follows. An investor has a certain or uncertain life
span, usually partitioned into a working life and a retirement phase. Income dur-
ing working life is most often assumed to be exogenously determined. It is also
assumed to be time dependent, stochastic and non-diversifiable, which sets these
models apart from other models in the extensive literature on dynamic portfolio
choice. Retirement income is either exogenously given or comes from some sav-
ings account managed in the interests of the agent. Each year, the agent decides
how much to consume and how to allocate savings among various asset classes
subject to several constraints. Her objective is to maximize expected discounted
life time utility.
The literature on life cycle portfolio choice has evolved in an attempt to find
a framework which is rich enough to explain actual household behaviour. The
motivation for new models is typically a “puzzle” which is defined as a discrepancy
between the predictions of financial theory and the choices investors actually make.
Thus, the models reviewed here are designed as positive theories. However, as will
be discussed later, they can also be interpreted as normative models explaining
investors how they should behave. There is need for such normative approaches,
because household data suggest that the investment behaviour of at least a minority
of investors is not compatible with welfare maximization.2
According to this normative perspective, life cycle models of portfolio choice
can also help to improve pension schemes. In most European countries, a ‘one-
size-fits-all’ philosophy still prevails in parts of the mandatory retirement savings
system. Thus, welfare gains might be achieved by allowing individualized strategies
with enhanced freedom of choice for the employee. Such strategies should be
specifically tailored to the individual employee’s circumstances. This calls for
a flexible analysis, for which life cyle models offer a useful framework.
1 See e.g. Danthine and Donaldson (2005) p. 76–77.
2 See Campbell (2006).
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During the last five years, research in this field has progressed rapidly, so that
a variety of life cycle models of portfolio choice now exists. It is the objective
of this state-of-the-art article to survey this stream of literature and to highlight
its achievements as well as remaining shortcomings. We will present a basic life
cycle model in the next section, before the extensions and modifications of more
complex models are discussed in Sect. 3.3
2 A basic model of life cycle portfolio decisions
The model presented in this section corresponds to the baseline case analysed by
Cocco et al. (2005). We use this setting to illustrate how the investor’s objective
function, her labor and retirement income as well as her savings account and asset
universe are typically modelled.
2.1 The investor’s objective function
The investor is assumed to have a finite horizon T and to be concerned about her
expected discounted lifetime utility derived from consumption. Taking into account
a realistic survival process, expected utility can be written as:
E0
T∑
t=1
β t
⎛
⎝
t−1∏
j=0
ψ j+1| j
⎞
⎠ u(Ct ), (1)
where β is the discount factor, u (•) a utility function, Ct periodic consumption and
ψt+1|t the probability to survive up to period t + 1 conditional on having survived
up to period t .4 In this baseline model and also in some of the more advanced
models, u (•) is assumed to be a standard power utility function:
u (Ct ) = C
1−γ
t
1 − γ . (2)
If the investor additionally derives utility from leaving a bequest Bt , the expectation
to be maximized becomes:
E0
T∑
t=1
β tt
[
ψt |t−1u(Ct ) +
(
1 − ψt |t−1
)
ϕ(Bt)
]
, (3)
with
t =
{(∏t−2
j=0 ψ j+1| j
)
∀ 1 < t ≤ T
1 for t = 1
3 It is important to note that this structure does not correspond to the time of publication of
the relevant papers. What we call base model did not necessarily form the starting point for
the extensions presented in Sect. 3. It rather serves as a base case for our exposition of more
intricate specifications of life cycle models. We chose this structure over one where the reviewed
contributions are nested in a general specification because the latter would inflate notation
unnecesarily without offering additional insights.
4 We use Et to denote expectation conditional on time t information.
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and where ϕ(•) is usually also a power utility function, possibly adjusted for
a parameter measuring the strength of the bequest motive.
2.2 Labor and retirement income
The investor begins to work at time t0 and retires at time tR. During working life, she
receives exogenous labor income Yt with yt ≡ log Yt most commonly modelled
as the sum of a permanent component and a transitory shock. The permanent
component consists of a deterministic function f (t, Zt ) of age and individual
characteristics Zt ,5 and of a persistent income component pt following a random
walk:
pt = pt−1 + vt . (4)
Thus:
yt = f (t, Zt ) + pt + et ∀ t0 ≤ t ≤ tR, (5)
where both et and vt are assumed to be iid normally distributed with mean zero.
This specification is adopted from the literature on life cycle saving.6
While most of the models to be reviewed below agree on (5) as their speci-
fication for income during working life, assumptions on retirement income vary.
A basic formulation postulates retirement income to be exogenously specified as
a constant fraction λ of the permanent component of labor income in the retirement
year tR . Thus,
yt = log λ +
( f (tR, ZtR
) + ptR
) ∀ t > tR. (6)
More generally, retirement income could be modelled as an arbitrary function of
income during working life.
Note that this specification of the investor’s income process implies that retire-
ment age (tR) is exogenous, a simplifying assumption that does not hold in practice.
In many real world pension systems retirement benefits can be withdrawn early or
late subject to particular constraints, thus making the time of retirement part of the
investor’s decision problem.7
2.3 Saving accounts and asset allocation
In the most basic of all specifications, we can picture the investor to own a savings
account to which all savings are automatically credited. The balance can also be
drawn down at the investor’s discretion.
More specifically, the investor starts any given period t with accumulated fi-
nancial wealth Wt and realizes labor income Yt . Together, Wt and Yt make up
all resources available for consumption. These resources are usually denominated
cash-on-hand (Xt ):
Xt ≡ Wt + Yt . (7)
5 The dimension of Zt depends on the number of individual characteristics considered.
6 See e.g. Hubbard et al. (1995), Carroll and Samwick (1997), Gourinchas and Parker (2002).
7 See e.g. French (2005) for a life-cycle model of savings (but excluding portfolio choice)
with endogenous labor supply and retirement.
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Next, the investor consumes the desired amount Ct . A fraction of the remaining
resources can be invested in a risky asset (αt ), while the remainder (1 − αt ) is
invested in a riskless asset. The riskless asset has known, constant gross return
Rr f . A standard assumption for the risky asset’s return is to add to the riskless rate
a risk premium κ disturbed by a white noise shock ζ :
Re,t+1 = Rr f + κ + ζt+1. (8)
The investor’s asset allocation and asset returns result in a compound portfolio
return of
Rp,t+1 ≡ αt Re,t+1 + (1 − αt ) Rr f
= (αt (κ + ζt+1) + Rr f
)
. (9)
The dynamics of financial wealth can then be summarized as:
Wt+1 = (Wt + Yt − Ct ) Rp,t+1. (10)
Using (7), this equation can also be re-written in terms of cash-on-hand as:
Xt+1 = (Xt − Ct ) Rp,t+1 + Yt+1. (11)
Of course, the investor’s asset menu can be broadened to include other assets
or loans. Also, liquidity constraints might be considered, which is important if the
investor is not allowed to withdraw funds from an account for a fixed period of time.
2.4 Optimization
In summary, in a basic life cycle model of portfolio choice with mortality, the
investor controls her consumption {Ct }T −1t=t0 as well as her risky asset share {αt }T −1t=t0
throughout lifetime, subject to three sources of uncertainty, the labor income shocks
et and vt and the stock return shock ζt .8 The investor’s optimization problem can
be stated as:
max
{αt }T −1t=t0 ,{Ct }
T −1
t=t0
(1)
(12)
s.t. (2), (5), (6), (9), (11), 0 ≤ αt ≤ 1, 0 ≤ Ct ≤ Xt and X0 given.
Notice from (12) that the optimization is subject to standard inequality constraints.
Firstly, the fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset is constrained to be between
zero and one. This means that the risky asset can neither be sold short nor can the
investment in the risky asset be levered up. By the second constraint, consumption
is bounded from above by cash-on-hand.
As is well known, a solution to problem (12) is a function (usually called policy
function) that specifies the optimal time paths for the control variables {α∗t
}T −1
t=t0
and
{
C∗t
}T −1
t=t0 , depending on the problem’s state variables. The state-space of the
current basic problem is spanned by three variables: time t , cash-on-hand Xt and
the random walk component of labor income pt . However, the state space can be
reduced to the two variables t and Xt by standardizing the entire problem by the
permanent component of labor income f (t, Zt ) + pt .9
8 The variables vt and ζt are often allowed to be mutually correlated.
9 See Carroll (2002a) for details.
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Due to the non-stationary labor income process, the finite horizon and the in-
equality constraints, the policy function cannot be obtained analytically, but must
be approximated numerically. The approximation is based on a recursive repre-
sentation of the problem by means of the Bellman Equation. Denoting by Vt (•)
the value function, this equation can be written as:
Vt (Xt ) = max
0≤Ct ≤Xt ,
0≤αt≤1
{
u(Ct ) + ψt+1|t βEt
[
Vt+1 (Xt+1)
]}
(13)
s.t. (11), (2), (5), (6), (9), X0 given.
In the last period (T ) it is optimal to consume all remaining resources which
implies that the value function corresponds to the instantaneous utility function:
VT (XT ) = u (XT ). The problem can then be solved by backward induction starting
in T − 1. Computationally, this is a non-trivial task because the value and policy
functions must be computed in every period and at every grid point of Xt by solving
a non-linear constrained optimization of an objective function with time-varying
state dynamics. Its evaluation requires a three-dimensional numerical integration
at peak times (during working life).10
Having obtained the policy functions, we know the investor’s optimal behavior
in every possible state of nature. However, this is of limited interest as many of
these states are improbable to arise. We are more interested in typical or average life
cycle consumption and asset allocation paths. To this means, it is standard practice
in the literature to picture an economy populated by many identical investors (i =
1, 2, ...N ) for each of whom {ζt }Ti,t=0, {et }tRi,t=0 and {vt }tRi,t=0 are simulated. Any
given triple {ζt }Ti,t=0, {et}tRi,t=0, {vt }tRi,t=0 implies a specific labor income stream
and, together with the policy functions, pins down investor i ’s optimal life cycle
patterns of consumption, portfolio choice and wealth. Having simulated triples for
all investors and having determined everyone’s optimal life cycle pattern, economy-
wide life cycle paths can then be obtained from averaging across the individual
investors’ optimal choices at every point in time.
As an alternative to the idea of an economy populated by many identical in-
vestors, the same simulation could also be interpreted from the point of view of only
one investor who is interested in possible paths which might obtain in the future.
2.5 Characteristic results
In Figure 1 we present characteristic results for the basic model. To derive Figure 1,
we solved and simulated problem (12) for the parameters reported below the figure.
Panel A shows mean and median forward simulated income as a function of
age together with the fifth and ninetyfifth quantiles. The average income profile
increases until the investor’s late fourties and slightly decreases thereafter. The
income drop at retirement age tR = 65 is due to the assumed replacement rate
λ = 0.7 in (6). A visual inspection of the interquantile range shows that the
simulation of the labor income process (5) and (4) generates noticeable income
heterogeneity throughout life.
10 During retirement, the required numerical integration is only one-dimensional. We will not
further elaborate on the details of this solution here. For further details, see e.g. Carroll (2002a).
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Fig. 1 The figure is based on solving and simulating problem (12) using the following parameters:
t0 = 22, tR = 65, T = 100, λ = 0.7, γ = 8, β = 0.96, Rr f = 1.02, κ = 0.04, σζ = 0.16,
σe = 0.26, σv = 0.10, ρv,ζ = 0. The Merton-Alpha implied by this parameter constellation is:
19.53%. The required conditional survival probabilities were obtained from the National Vital
Statistics Report’s Life Tables for the total population in 2001 for the US; see Arias (2004), p 7.
To obtain the deterministic part of labor income we used the third order polynomial estimated by
Cocco et al. (2005) for High School graduates in the US; see Cocco et al. (2005), pp 499–500.
For this reason, all absolute magnitudes in this figure are in thousands of 1992 USD. The model
was solved on a grid with 223 states for the cash-on-hand to permanent income ratio. {ζt }Ti,t=0,
{et }tRi,t=0 and {vt }tRi,t=0 were then simulated 10 000 times. For the simulations we assumed that each
investor starts life with zero initial wealth. For each simulation we obtained the corresponding
optimal evolution of cash-on-hand, wealth, consumption, and the risky asset share. These were
finally used to compute the cross-sectional statistics reported in this figure.
Panel B represents the policy functions for consumption as a fraction of perma-
nent income at different ages. These functions determine the investor’s savings at
every point in the state space and are thus responsible for wealth accumulation. The
consumption policy functions are generally concave, displaying a sharp drop in the
marginal propensity to consume at particular cash to permanent income ratios.
Panel C shows the same statistics as panel A, but for forward simulated wealth.
In the beginning of working life, the investor is liquidity-constrained and does
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not save much. But starting in the early thirties, savings become sizable to reach
their maximum just before retirement. During the retirement phase, the investor
completely dissaves her wealth to be able to consume above income. Heterogeneity
is also present in the wealth profiles: ‘Rich’ households accumulate about nine times
as much wealth as ‘poor’ households at the peak. Notice also that heterogeneity is
highest just before retirement.
Panel D shows mean forward simulated income, wealth and consumption as
functions of age in one graph. The panel illustrates that the investor is able to smooth
consumption out over her life-time using income and wealth accumulation.
Most interesting for our purposes are panels E and F. Panel F shows mean,
median, fifth and ninetyfifth quantiles of the investor’s forward simulated risky asset
share as a function of age. In line with popular wisdom and standard investment
advice,11 the investor has her portfolio fully invested in the risky asset until the early
thirties and then gradually reduces this exposure to around 50% at the beginning
of retirement. But contrary to standard investment advice, the economic rationale
behind this behaviour is not that the young investor has a longer horizon to recoup
eventual losses from equity investments. Instead, in the present model the investor’s
life-time equity profile is the result of a subtle interaction between labor income
dynamics, wealth accumulation and age, as is demonstrated in panel E. It plots the
investor’s policy functions for the risky asset share for various ages as a function
of the cash-on-hand to permanent income ratio.
A first important insight conveyed by panel E is that independent of age the
policy functions for the risky asset share are convex, downward-sloping curves.
This is true because part of the investor’s future labor income can be considered
an implicit riskless asset holding.12 Thus, for given future labor income (i.e. at
a given age), an investor with low cash-on-hand can afford to invest a high fraction
of her financial wealth in the risky asset because she already has a high fraction of
her entire wealth (including future labor income) invested in a quasi riskless asset.
For an investor with extremely high cash-on-hand, future labor income and thus
implicit riskless asset holdings become negligible which is why she invests more
conservatively.13 In fact, for cash-on-hand high enough to completely undermine
the existence of risky labor income, the policy functions asymptote towards the
constant Merton-Alpha, αM :14
αM = κ
γ σ 2ζ
(14)
where σ 2ζ denotes the variance of ζ .
A second insight delivered by panel E is that during retirement, the policy
functions become more conservative with age, i.e. they shift to the southwest of the
11 See e.g. Bodie (2003).
12 This part is smaller the higher the correlation of labor income with the shocks on the risky
asset returns.
13 See also Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996).
14 See Merton (1971). This result was derived assuming continuous-time, perfect markets,
a geometric Brownian motion for the risky asset’s price, utility of the general HARA form
u (C) = γ
(1−γ )
(
τC
γ
+ η
)γ
and no labor income. Samuelson (1969) derived the same result in
a discrete time setting.
How to invest over the life cycle: Insights from theory 227
figure. This is due to the fact that the present value of future labor income decreases
with age during retirement. For given cash-on-hand this implies a diminishing
implicit riskless asset position which must be compensated by a more conservative
risky asset share in financial wealth.
To be able to re-trace the forward simulated equity share in panel F, it is im-
portant to consider how the policy function for the risky asset share and the cash-
on-hand to permanent income ratio interact over the life cycle.15 In the beginning,
the investor’s cash-on-hand to permanent income ratio is low and the policy func-
tion is aggressive (northeast of panel E) implying a 100% equity investment. Then
the cash-on-hand to permanent income ratio gradually increases while the policy
functions shift to the southwest. During retirement, the cash-on-hand to perma-
nent income ratio is again reduced while the policy functions still become more
conservative. Now, the relative speed of the cash reduction versus the increased
portfolio conservatism imposed by the reduction in future labor income determines
whether the equity share increases or decreases. If cash is reduced quickly enough,
the equity share becomes more aggressive again during retirement, as can be seen
in panel F. This finding might appear counter intuitive, but it depends on the exact
mortality process used. Mortality is the main determinant of the speed of cash re-
duction during retirement: in (13), a lower survival rate effectively implies a lower
discount factor making the investor more impatient. For example, men usually have
lower conditional survival rates than women at advanced ages. As a consequence,
in the present model, they would reduce their wealth more quickly and thus invest
more aggressively than women during late retirement.
The baseline results turn out to be quite robust. Cocco et al. (2005), e.g., show
that riskier labor income, a transitory shock on retirement income, a positive prob-
ability (iid) for a low income state during retirement (health shock) and different
bequest intensities or equity premia have only minor effects on life cycle asset allo-
cations.16 However, a higher correlation between permanent labor income shocks
and stock returns or a positive probability for labor income to reach a very low state
during working life (disaster state) generate hump shaped equity profiles peaking
at 100% or below between ages 45-50. When the investor is allowed to borrow
at the expected equity return, equity holdings are zero until around age 40, then
increase to about 100% at age 65 and decrease again during retirement.
2.6 Portfolio puzzles
Basic theoretical models as the one outlined in the previous section generally
bear four robust implications: (i) if a fixed cost of stock market participation is
included,17 the participation rate - i.e. the fraction of investors who have paid the
fixed cost - in the stock market is predicted to increase rapidly to 100% among
young investors and remain constant thereafter. (ii) Young investors are predicted
15 We do not plot the average cash-on-hand to permanent income ratio separately because it
qualitatively resembles the wealth path in panel C of Fig. 1. It reaches a high of about 15 around
retirement age.
16 Of course, this does not necessarily hold in extreme cases. For example, a very high bequest
intensity does lead to a less risky equity share decreasing in age.
17 This could easily be accomplished in the basic model by constraining risky asset holdings
using a dummy that equals one if a particular fixed cost has already been paid and zero otherwise.
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to be fully invested in stocks and (iii) the risky asset share is expected to decline
in age and also in cash-on-hand (iv).
These theoretical results are in stark disagreement with available empirical evi-
dence. Table 1 summarizes several recent empirical studies on household portfolio
choice for different countries.18 These studies all use cross-sectional or panel data
from representative household surveys to analyse household portfolio choice in
their respective countries. The authors devote particular attention to two central
questions: first, what percentage of households owns risky assets (participation or
ownership rate) and second, what fraction of their assets do those who own risky
assets invest in those assets (conditional risky asset share)? For both items interest
is centered on their behavior as a function of the household head’s age and partic-
ular measures of the household’s wealth. To disentangle the ownership and share
decisions, most authors employ a sample selection model where the discrete selec-
tion equation captures the ownership decision and a continuous equation represents
the risky asset share and its determinants. To estimate these models, a variant of
Heckman’s two-step procedure is usually employed.
Most of the studies find ownership of risky assets to be hump-shaped in age
and increasing in wealth. Results on conditional risky asset shares are mixed, but
mainly suggest a constant or concave age-pattern and an invariant or increasing
behavior with respect to wealth.
Unlike theoretical models, empirical results thus seem to imply anything but
complete equity specialization and participation of young investors, or risky as-
set shares declining in age or in cash-on-hand. Rather, (a) a sizable fraction of
households is usually found not to participate in stock markets, (b) conditional
asset shares among the young are generally found to be at the same time low and
(c) hump-shaped, increasing or constant in age. Also, (d) the risky asset share is
mainly found to increase in measures of wealth.19
These discrepancies between theory and evidence are sometimes called port-
folio puzzles.20 More specifically, the conflicting pair (i versus a) can be termed
a participation puzzle whereas the pairs (ii versus b), (iii versus c) and (iv versus
d) are known as composition puzzles. Theorists widely perceive these puzzles as
a challenge to build models that yield implications more in line with the data.
3 Modifications and extensions
3.1 Overview
Apart from the motivation to resolve portfolio puzzles, researchers have also ex-
tended the basic model of Sect. 2 to gain insight into the restrictiveness of different
assumptions. More generally, extended models allow us to study welfare effects of
policy proposals and of various institutional settings.
18 See Ameriks and Zeldes (2001), Bertaut and StarrMcCluer (2002), Banks and Tanner (2002),
Eymann and Boersch-Supan (2002), Alessi et al. (2002), Andersson (2001) and Guiso and Jappelli
(2002).
19 See Guiso et al. (2002), Dynan et al. (2003), Carroll (2002b), Hurd (2002), Curcuru (2003),
Heaton and Lucas (2000) and Davis, Kubler and Willen (2004) for further empirical evidence on
household portfolio choice.
20 Haliassos and Michaelides (2002) p. 55.
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Due to the complexity of the problem and the computation time involved, it is
impossible to study all potential determinants of life cycle investing simultaneously.
Each model focuses on only a few determinants, as is illustrated in Figure 2. This
figure arranges the models included in this review according to four dimensions:
the assumptions about the investor’s preferences (at the top), the labor income
process (at the bottom), and the asset classes available. The distinction between
non-financial assets (on the right) and financial assets (on the left) is important,
because the retirement income is primarily financed by financial assets and their
proceeds. Of course, the distinction is in some way artificial, since stocks and real
estate assets cannot always be unambiguously classified.
Fig. 2 Classification of reviewed models. The models are surrounded by dotted lines, the clas-
sification scheme consists of drawn-through lines
The basic Cocco et al. (2005) model presented in the last section can be seen
as a combination of standard assumptions. Our ‘routing’ through the other contri-
butions is as follows. We will first describe the consequences of including further
financial assets apart from stocks and a risk-free savings account. Secondly, we
will turn to alternative preference structures, where the focus will be on habit for-
mation utility and recursive preferences. The assets and the labor income processes
are kept at their basic formulation. In the third step, we will examine attempts to
endogenize assets omitted in previous models, namely human capital and hous-
ing. Finally, the implications of more realistic exogenous income processes will be
considered. This routing reflects the principal steps taken in the literature to come
up with results that are more consistent with empirical observations.
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3.2 Retirement savings account
Campbell et al. (2000) extend the basic model of Sect. 2 to analyse welfare impli-
cations of alternative retirement savings systems.21 The investor in Campbell et al.
(2000) is assumed to have a mandatory retirement savings account into which she
has to pay a fraction of each period’s log labor income.
Compared to the basic model above, the retirement account in Campbell et al.
(2000) restricts the investor’s choices and thus produces a welfare loss. How does
the investor react to the new restrictions? Consider first the case where savings
in the retirement account are fully invested in the riskfree asset. Compared to the
basic model, savings in the retirement account now crowd out liquid wealth. As in
the basic model, stockholdings in liquid wealth display a decrease and subsequent
increase in midlife, but are generally more aggressive due to the sizable riskfree
asset position in the retirement account.22
When half of the mandatory account is invested in the risky asset,23 the de-
crease and subsequent increase of the equity share in midlife is now more pro-
nounced and pointed. The equity share reaches a low level of about 25% shortly
before retirement. The main conclusions, however, are the same as in the basic
model.
3.3 Realistic borrowing regimes
A realistic borrowing regime is interesting to study in a life cycle model due to its
ambiguous effects on wealth accumulation: On the one hand, the investor might
borrow in order to level out transitory income shocks and to smooth consump-
tion. This usually comes at the expense of lower wealth accumulation. On the
other hand, provided that the net expected return from levered equity holdings
is positive, a higher leverage will increase wealth on average. As Davis et al.
(2004) show, findings in this context critically depend on the relative magnitudes
of the riskfree rate, the borrowing rate and the expected return on equity: a bor-
rowing rate exceeding the riskfree rate (but not the expected return on equity) is
found to decrease average absolute equity holdings substantially and a borrowing
rate equal to the expected return on equity (baseline case) is found to minimize
average absolute equity demand. Also, the participation rate is found to be sig-
nificantly lower in the baseline case than in any of the other borrowing regimes:
it is found to increase from 25% at age 20 to full participation not before age
50.
These findings are due to the fact that the relation between the cost of bor-
rowing and equity demand is non-monotonic in the model by Davis et al. (2004):
as the borrowing rate increases from the risk free rate towards the equity return,
21 The model by Campbell and Viceira (2002) is a simplified version of Campbell et al. (2000)
used for illustrative purposes in their volume on long term portfolio choice. The only difference
to Campbell et al. (2000) is the assumption that all wealth in the illiquid retirement account is
invested in the riskfree asset and that there is no fixed cost of stock market participation.
22 Campbell et al. (2000) set the risk aversion parameter to 5, whereas we used a value of 7.
Thus, the set-ups are not perfectly comparable.
23 In this case, Campbell et al. (2000) reduce the contribution rate from 10% to 6% in order to
keep the average replacement rate at the same level as before.
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leverage premium and borrowing capacity (present value of lowest possible fu-
ture labor income discounted at borrowing rate) decrease, which implies declining
average equity holdings. When the borrowing rate increases beyond the expected
equity return so that the leverage premium becomes negative, investors continue
to borrow only to smooth consumption or income shocks and no longer to ‘lever
up’ their equity holdings. The higher the borrowing rate the less inclined they are
to borrow. They will thus accumulate more wealth which leads to higher average
equity holdings.
Davis et al. (2004) compare predicted debt and equity shares with empirical
data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. Assuming their baseline case, they
find a distinctly better fit to the empirical debt data as well as the data on equity
holdings and participation rates than in the base model without borrowing. The
authors conclude: “In short, a realistic treatment of borrowing also brings the theory
closer to the evidence on life-cycle patterns in equity holdings and participation
rates”.24
In a related paper, Willen (2003) shows that a realistic treatment of credit
markets can also help to explain the frequently observed dramatic dependence of
entrepreneurial households on only one entrepreneurial asset. His model is identi-
cal to that of Davis et al. (2004) except for an enriched asset universe. It contains
an entrepreneurial asset with an uncertain return, an unsecured loan with limit-
ed exposure at a low rate and unlimited exposure at a higher rate. Additionally,
there is a loan with a rate between the riskfree rate and the lower unsecured loan
rate, that must be collateralized either by equity or by the entrepreneurial asset.
Willen (2003) shows that wealth is invested almost exclusively in private equity
if the wealth-to-income ratio is low, but that this exposure decreases in wealth-
to-income. With rising wealth-to-income ratios over the life-cycle, private equity
holdings (as a fraction of all risky investments) will exhibit a decreasing lifetime
pattern.
3.4 Alternative preference structures
Preferences used in the basic model are separable across time and states of nature.
This means that the marginal utility of consumption in one state of nature and
point in time is independent of consumption in other states or points in time. But,
as Cochrane (1997) argues, it could well be the case that “the marginal utility of
consumption in the sunny state of the world is affected by the level of consumption
in the rainy state”25 and that “yesterday’s consumption can have an impact on to-
day’s appetite”.26 These arguments call for time and state non-separable preference
specifications. Following the literature on the equity premium puzzle,27 two com-
mon non-separabilities have been analysed in life cycle models: habit formation
and recursive preferences according to Epstein and Zin (1989).
24 Davis et al. (2004), p. 20.
25 Cochrane (1997), p. 19.
26 Cochrane (1997), p. 20.
27 Cochrane (1997) and Campbell (2003) review this literature.
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3.4.1 Models with habit formation utility
Habit formation preferences formalize the idea that investors get used to their
standard of living so that they attempt to make sure that resources will always
suffice to consume above habit. Investors with low wealth are exposed to a high
risk of consumption to fall short of habit. The young, poor investor would thus be
expected to invest more conservatively. This could potentially resolve puzzles ii-b
and iii-c.
Gomes and Michaelides (2003) consider habit formation in the model of Sect. 2.
The Gomes and Michaelides (2003) investor has objective function (1) only that
instantaneous utility is now defined over consumption Ct and habit Ht . They pro-
pose two specifications, where utility is either driven by the ratio of consumption
to habit (ratio habit specification) as in (15):
u(Ct , Ht) = 1
(1 − γ )
(
Ct
Hωhst
)(1−γ )
, (15)
or it is driven by the difference between consumption and habit (difference habit
specification) as in (16):
u(Ct , Ht) = 1
(1 − γ ) (Ct − ωhs Ht)
(1−γ ) , (16)
where ωhs is a parameter that measures habit strength. Habit itself is modelled as
a weighted average of past habit and past consumption:
Ht = (1 − ωhp)Ht−1 + ωhpCt−1, (17)
where ωhp denotes the weight.28 In a very similar model presented by Polkov-
nichenko (2006), habit is more simply postulated to be a function of lagged con-
sumption only.
Contrary to the power utility models considered in Sections 2, 3.2 and 3.3,
habit formation entails important additional constraints on the evolution of en-
dogenous state variables: First, current consumption must exceed current habit in
each period; secondly, current consumption is chosen such that, even for the worst
possible realizations of labor income and stock return shocks, resources suffice
to consume above habit in the future. Polkovnichenko (2006) derives and illus-
trates these constraints analytically.29 Due to their existence, the investment policy
strongly depends on the level of wealth.
For intermediate to high wealth, the investment behavior in habit models is
similar to expected utility models.30 However, the closer cash-on-hand is to its
minimum feasible level, the more conservative young and old investors must invest
to alleviate the magnitudes of the worst case shocks. The effect is more pronounced
for young investors because income uncertainty plays a more important role for
them.
28 Subscript hp stands for habit persistance.
29 The constraints maintain that, in a given period and for a given current habit, current cash
plus the minimum present value of labor income over a specific horizon must exceed the infimum
of the present value of future habits over the same horizon.
30 See Sect. 2.5 above.
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Therefore, unlike the standard CRRA model, one would expect poor, young
households to have a conservative equity share in a difference habit model. But con-
trary to this expectation, neither Gomes and Michaelides (2003) nor Polkovnichenko
(2006) find this to be the case in simulations of their baseline models. Gomes and
Michaelides (2003), e.g., find an average forward simulated equity share of es-
sentially 100% at all ages. This result proves to be robust in sensitivity analyses.
Similarly, Polkovnichenko (2006) finds only minor differences between his base-
line simulated equity-age-profile and that implied by an otherwise identical CRRA
model.
It is only when Polkovnichenko (2006) calibrates his model with a 0.5% prob-
ability of a zero labor income draw in any of the working life years that he finds
more conservative stock holdings among young investors in his habit model. Full
equity specialization is delayed until the investor’s early fourties when it reaches
its maximum and starts to decrease again.31 However, the equity share is still high
for young investors: By the age of 30, they are already invested by more than 80%
in stocks.32
In summary, for the considered ratio and difference habit specifications, equity
shares are found to be unrealistically high at close to 100% for all ages. Portfolios
are only slightly interior at very young ages. Gomes and Michaelides (2003) con-
clude: “Contrary to the initial motivation, we find that introducing habit formation
preferences in the standard life-cycle asset allocation model actually decreases
its ability to match the observed empirical regularities. (...) We conclude that in-
ternal habit formation preferences on their own are unlikely to resolve existing
portfolio composition puzzles.” 33 Only with a disastrous labor income shock in
the Polkovnichenko (2006) model do more plausible, hump-shaped and interior
age profiles obtain. But, as shown by Cocco et al. (2005), such a shock is able to
generate similar profiles in a model with CRRA preferences, too. Nevertheless,
the model by Polkovnichenko (2006) is able to resolve one of the puzzles, since
it implies - in line with the data - that the risky asset share should increase with
cash-on-hand.
3.4.2 Models with recursive preferences and preference heterogeneity
The Epstein and Zin (1989) generalization of the power utility function allows to
disentangle the degree of relative risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. Risk aversion affects investment in the risky asset directly as well as
indirectly through its effect on precautionary savings. The elasticity of intertempo-
ral substitution mainly accounts for the magnitude of retirement savings. Since total
savings are an important determinant of asset allocation behavior, one might expect
that appropriately ‘tuned’ risk aversion and elasticity of intertemporal substitution
could resolve one or more of the portfolio puzzles.
31 These findings remain essentially unchanged for different utility curvature and strenghts of
the bequest motive.
32 With a low income state that obtains with a 1.3% probability, results are qualitatively identical,
but young investors’ equity share is even higher.
33 Gomes and Michaelides (2003), p. 5.
How to invest over the life cycle: Insights from theory 235
The Epstein–Zin investor derives utility from current consumption Ct and from
expected, discounted utility next period according to the recursion
ut =
{(
1 − βψt+1|t
)
C
1− 1
η
t
+βEt
[
ψt+1|t u1−γt+1 +
(
1 − ψt+1|t
)
v(Xt+1)
] 1−1/η
1−γ
} 1
1−1/η
, (18)
with terminal condition
uT+1 = ι
(1 − γ )
(
XT +1
ι
)1−γ
, (19)
where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and η the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution. Considering the second term inside the curly brackets on the
right hand side of (18), it becomes apparent that the expected, discounted utility
next period is a survival probability weighted function of next period’s regular
utility, ut+1, realized in case of survival and of next period’s utility over bequested
wealth, v(Xt+1), realized in case of death.34 The weights are given by the con-
ditional probabilities of survival and death next period ψt+1|t and
(
1 − ψt+1|t
)
,
respectively. Unlike standard power utility, preference specification (18) does not
require η and γ to be inversely related, but it nests this constellation as a special
case: setting η = 1
γ
in (18) makes the recursion linear. Solving it forward then
yields the standard power utility model.35
With η = 1
γ
, the model by Gomes and Michaelides (2005) is practically identi-
cal to the baseline case in Cocco et al. (2005). However, reducing risk aversion (γ )
while maintaining a low elasticity of intertemporal substitution (η) produces dra-
matically lower wealth accumulation at all ages. Highest wealth is now only about
17% of peak wealth in the baseline case. Consequently, with a fixed cost of market
participation, full participation in the stock market can be delayed significantly.
Yet, due to the lower risk aversion, the equity share of those, who have already
payed the fixed cost of participation, is again a flat 100% at all ages. Thus, a re-
cursive preference formulation alone cannot generate both a sensible participation
rate and, conditional on participation, a sensible equity profile.
To overcome this problem, Gomes and Michaelides (2005) relax the identical
agent assumption. They first solve the optimization problem of an investor with
relatively low γ and low η and that of an investor with higher γ and higher η. In
the forward simulation36 they then assume a population composed only of these
two types of investors. With this preference heterogeneity the model economy
displays a participation rate and an average equity share among participants close
to data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. A remaining deficiency of this
experiment is that it slightly overestimates participation during retirement and
more significantly overestimates the equity share of very young investors.
34 The functional form of v(•) is given by the right-hand side of (19).
35 See also Campbell and Viceira (2002), p. 42–44.
36 Actually, Gomes and Michaelides (2005) compute transition distributions, but they also carry
out regular Monte Carlo simulations; see their footnote 12.
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The model by Gomes et al. (2004) blends elements of Campbell et al. (2000)
and Gomes and Michaelides (2005) and extends them to a more realistic tax envi-
ronment. As in Campbell et al. (2000), the investor owns a liquid savings account
and an illiquid retirement account. But while the former is now assumed to be a tax-
able account, the latter is tax-deferred. Therefore, the investors try to profit from tax
arbitrage between the two accounts. As an additional complication, Gomes et al.
(2004) model two types of investors, indirect and direct stockholders. The indirect
stockholders can hold equity only in their tax-deferred account and are assumed to
have low risk aversion (γ ) and elasticity of intertemporal substitution (η), whereas
direct stockholders are characterized by high γ and η.37
In the forward simulation, the age profile of equity as a share of wealth is found
to be decreasing in both accounts. Direct stockholders hold mixed portfolios in both
accounts which seems to be in conflict with tax arbitrage, but is in line with empirical
data. This implication of the model is due to the cross sectional averaging in an
economy populated by investors with different lengths of access to the tax-deferred
account. The indirect stockholders are less concerned about background risk (due
to lower γ ) and saving for retirement (due to lower η). Thus, they accumulate less
wealth in both accounts and invest nearly the entire tax-deferred wealth in equity.
3.5 Endogenizing human capital
Endogeneity of human capital can be achieved by assuming that the agent derives
utility from leisure and receives labor income in relation to her working hours.
In this style, Bodie et al. (1992) compare the consumption and portfolio choice
problem of an investor who decides on labor supply once and for all to that of
an agent who can continuously vary her supply under both a riskless and a risky
wage regime. In continuous time the authors are able to derive closed form solu-
tions from which a main lesson can be learnt: Everything else equal, greater labor
supply flexibility permits particularly the young investor to hold a higher fraction
of financial wealth in risky assets. More recently, Bodie et al. (2004) derive closed
forms for the joint consumption-, labor/leisure- and portfolio choice problem of
a continuous time life cycle investor (finite horizon, explicit retirement phase) with
general habit formation preferences, a risky wage rate and access to a financial mar-
ket with many assets and stochastic coefficients. With this model, they study the
implications of habits and of a deferred retirement date on optimal consumption-,
labor/leisure- and portfolio choice.38
A different approach to endogenize human capital is suggested by Roussanov
(2004). He grants the investor an option to increase her human capital by invest-
ing in education. His investor has a standard power utility objective function with
37 Both direct and indirect shareholders are further subdivided in groups of investors that differ
in the number of years since they had first access to a tax-deferred account.
38 Bodie et al. (1992) and Bodie et al. (2004) are not directly comparable to the models reviewed
here: Bodie et al. (1992) is a continuous time model without borrowing restrictions. The wage
rate is assumed to be perfectly positively correlated with the return on the risky asset in the risky
wage regime and labor income is presumed to be insurable. Similarly, in Bodie et al. (2004) asset
holdings are not constrained and borrowing against future labor income is possible for the greater
part of the analysis. If borrowing against future labor income is not permitted, they are able to
derive explicit solutions for consumption and labor choice, but not for portfolio choice.
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a terminal bequest motive. The investor controls her labor income by deciding
whether to work or to study in a given period. While working, labor income is an
iid random variable which is augmented by the deterministic return to education
after having successfully completed the study program. The investor can study only
once.39 While studying, she cannot work, but has to pay education costs. Contrary
to previous formulations, working life is not distinguished from retirement through
different labor income characteristics. Instead, a high bequest intensity proxies for
a retirement phase.
In this setting, Roussanov (2004) finds the equity share to be a non-monotonic
function of wealth prior to completion of studies. For low levels of wealth, the
investor has a high equity share because riskless investing would not generate suf-
ficient return to afford education. For wealth close to education costs, investing is
found to be conservative to ensure sufficiency of funds for education next period.
For magnitudes of wealth other than these two extremes, the equity share is found
to be a decreasing function of wealth, as in the basic model. In forward simula-
tions, Roussanov (2004) mainly finds interior, hump-shaped age-equity-profiles
with a peak of below 80% for all considered levels of initial wealth. Once again,
a seemingly unrealistic implication of the Roussanov (2004) model is that poor
young investors are fully invested in stocks, but in this setting only as long as they
have not yet invested in education.
3.6 Endogenizing housing
A potentially important determinant of savings and investment behavior omitted so
far is housing. By considering labor income as net of rental payments, all models
analysed so far implicitly assume that housing services can only be rented. Intro-
ducing a realistic housing framework is not trivial since housing is at the same time
a durable consumption good yielding utility and an asset class of its own.40
Cocco (2004) assumes an investor with objective (3), where ψt+1|t = 1 ∀ t and
u(•) is a Cobb–Douglas function with Ht the units of housing consumed and ωhp
a parameter measuring relative housing preference:
u(Ct , Ht) =
(
C1−ωhpt H
ωhp
t
)1−γ
(1 − γ ) . (20)
This means the investor is now additionally concerned about consuming units
of housing, with a house of bigger size yielding higher utility. House prices are
assumed to be a function of the permanent component of labor income. Owning and
selling a house involve maintenance and selling costs, respectively. The investor
can mortgage against her house at a constant rate up to a given fraction of house
value.
In a cross sectional regression of simulated equity share on several explana-
tory variables, Cocco (2004) finds a positive correlation between financial net
worth – defined as the sum of equity, riskless asset holdings net of debt and house
value – and the weight of stocks in the portfolio of liquid assets. Also, equity share
39 The duration of the education is a function of an exogenously given, positive termination
probability.
40 See, e.g., Yao and Zhang (2005).
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is found to be positively correlated with mortgage debt because investors with
higher future labor income invest more aggressively and are also found to borrow
more. Another prediction of the model is that investors with low financial net worth
hold leveraged portfolios that are strongly concentrated in real estate. Stock market
participation is low among these investors. Stock holdings as a fraction of assets
are generally found to increase during working life. It is only after retirement that
stock holdings as a fraction of financial and total assets (also including discounted
labor income) are lowered, whereas they continue to increase relative to liquid
assets. Stock holdings are found to be substantially lower for higher risk aversion,
stronger housing preference and higher discount rates. A fixed cost of stock market
participation is found to reduce participation significantly. This is due to the lower
liquid asset holdings among real estate owners.
Yao and Zhang (2005) study an extended model that allows the agent not only
to own housing as in Cocco (2004), but also to rent housing services. If a renter
in a given period, the investor can keep renting or start owning next period. If an
owner, she can either keep the house or sell the house and subsequently choose
between renting or owning (a house of different size). Yao and Zhang (2005) also
assume an exogenous, binomial moving shock which – at times – forces the investor
to move and thus – if not a renter – to sell her house. The investor has objective (3)
with u(•) given by (20).41 Housing is considered as an asset class with stochastic
return which may be correlated with labor income growth. A mortgage with limited
exposure is available to house-owners.
An advantage of the Yao and Zhang (2005) model is that it allows to analyse
welfare and portfolio choice implications of the simplifying assumptions ‘owning
only’ (Cocco (2004)) and ‘renting only’ (all other models in this paper). Both
assumptions exclude combinations of both possibilities and therefore entail welfare
losses: for the assumption ‘renting only’ these are found to be in the order of 8%
of total current wealth, whereas they can reach 25% of total current wealth if only
owning is allowed. The simplifying assumptions also induce a bias in portfolio
choice: whereas the equity share is slightly upward biased when only renting is
allowed, it exhibits a more severe downward bias when only owning is possible.
When stock and housing returns are positively correlated as compared to a zero
correlation, owners have a lower equity share, while renters have a higher share
throughout life due to the renters’ effective short position in housing.
Interesting results also emerge from simulating the model forward for renters
aged 20 with zero initial wealth: The fraction of investors owning a house increases
rapidly and by age 40, the majority are owners. Interestingly, the average renter aged
20 is predicted to be fully invested in stocks, but to reduce her exposure gradually
while accumulating savings to pay down a house. When the renter becomes an
owner, the equity share in total assets is reduced (crowding out), whereas it is
increased in liquid wealth (diversification benefit). The older the investor, the lower
is the equity share in both liquid wealth and net worth.
41 The bequest motive is different from the one in earlier models in that the investor intends
to bequeath an annuity over a given horizon to provide for the beneficiary’s consumption and
housing. For details, see Yao and Zhang (2005), p. 7.
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3.7 Different labor income and stock return dynamics
In all previous models, the vector of innovations to stock returns and labor income
δt ≡ (etvtζt )′ was assumed to be independently and identically distributed, where
at most a contemporaneous correlation between the shock to stock returns ζt and the
shock to the permanent component of labor income vt was allowed. Lynch and Tan
(2004) argue for a more realistic treatment of the dynamics of δt that incorporates
a macroeconomic perspective. Their idea is to let the conditional distribution of
δt depend on the business cycle so that the first two moments of log labor income
growth can be explained by a variable that is known to predict the business cycle.
Empirically, they find that log labor income growth is negatively and volatility
of log labor income growth positively correlated with lagged annual dividend
yields. Because dividend yields are counter-cyclical, this implies that log labor
income growth is pro-cyclical, whereas volatility of labor income growth is counter-
cyclical. Since realized stock return is pro-cyclical, this further means that realized
stock return and future “labor income opportunities” 42 (i.e. labor income growth
and volatility of labor income growth) are positively correlated. A positive relation
between current returns and future investment opportunities generates a negative
hedging demand for stocks by (risk averse) long term investors. Thus, an investor
who incorporates predictability of the first two moments of labor income growth
into her rationale should have lower equity holdings. This reduction should be
stronger for young investors, as labor income plays a particularly prominent role
for them.
And indeed, as compared to a standard power utility model without predictabil-
ity, Lynch and Tan (2004) find that the presence of the two predictability channels
(labor income growth and volatility of labor income growth) reduces average stock
holdings dramatically for investors with low to medium wealth income ratios in
the first month of their horizon. The reduction is of a magnitude of 77.2% for zero
wealth to income and still amounts to 68% for wealth to income of 30. An interest-
ing finding also pertains to the average equity share as a function of the wealth to
income ratio: with the volatility channel present it becomes sharply increasing for
low wealth to income ratios and flat for higher wealth to income ratios. With regard
to life cycle effects, Lynch and Tan (2004) find that the two predictability channels
lead to a lower leveled hump-shaped age-equity profile peaking around age 50. Fi-
nally, adding the two business cycle channels results in elevated non-participation
among the youngest investors. For instance, a 22 year old investor with zero wealth
is a non-participant in 80% of the cases in the first year. Non-participation is then
found to decrease with age, reaching levels below 10% at the early 40’s.
Similar to Lynch and Tan (2004), Benzoni et al. (2005) argue that an advanced
treatment of labor income and stock return dynamics might produce more realistic
life cycle equity holdings. They consider a life cycle model with the standard
transitory and permanent idiosyncratic labor income shocks as well as a potentially
low contemporaneous correlation between permanent labor income shocks and
stock returns. Additionally, as a central element of their model, they account for
possible cointegration between labor income and stock returns.
The model by Benzoni et al. (2005) predicts that young agents are not invested
in the risky asset approximately until age 30 when stockholdings begin to increase
42 Lynch and Tan (2004), p. 2.
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sub-proportionally to reach a maximum of around 50% shortly before retirement.
This finding is due to cointegration: Young investors hold wealth only in the form
of future labor income, and the return on their human capital is highly susceptible
to stock market risk due to the cointegration effect. Thus, they draw the conse-
quence not to hold any stocks. For older investors with fewer years of working
life remaining, return on human capital is less susceptible to market risk because
cointegration does no longer affect their future labor income.
4 Conclusions and future perspectives
The main characteristics of all models reviewed in this paper are summarized
in Table 2. We have learnt the following lessons from this literature: standard
power utility life cycle models do not resolve any of the existing portfolio puzzles,
they rather contribute to the disaccord between theoretical and empirical results.
Introducing a fixed cost of stock market participation to these standard models
delays full stock market participation slightly among the very young, but is of no
help otherwise. Similarly, habit formation preferences do not resolve the puzzles
either. Only with a disaster state in the labor income process can participation
among the young and conditional equity shares be somewhat reduced. Models
with recursive preferences give mixed results. On the one hand, endowing the
representative investor with low risk aversion and a low elasticity of intertemporal
substitution results in a low stock market participation. On the other hand, a low
risk aversion predicts high conditional equity shares. Only by forcing preference
heterogeneity on the population, both the participation puzzle and the conditional
equity share puzzle can be partly resolved.
Endogenizing labor income by granting the investor an opportunity to invest
in her own human capital generates interior, hump-shaped age-equity profiles.
However, it still implies high equity shares among young investors as these are
willing to take significant risk in order to increase the likelihood of earning enough
to soon start education.
Models that allow the investor to consume housing services and own real estate
are able to resolve all puzzles at least partially. Some results indicate that it might
be important to consider ownership and rental markets at the same time. Yet, such
models are cumbersome due to their complex renting/owning dynamics and can
only be solved with supercomputers.
Finally, models with advanced labor income and stock return dynamics appear
to be very successful: they are entirely standard among all model dimensions,
yet extend the labor income specification to include either a correlation between
current stock returns and future investment opportunities or a cointegration of labor
income and stock returns. Both specifications elegantly resolve all puzzles.
In summary, the literature on life cycle portfolio choice has effectively devel-
oped a positive tradition, according to which portfolio “puzzles” are tackled by
the presumption that investors do not generally make “wrong” decisions, but have
objective functions or are subject to restrictions not adequately accounted for in
the early models. The new models help to resolve “puzzles” by better explaining
the prevailing investment behavior. Most importantly, the literature highlights the
decisive role played by an investor’s labor income in determining optimal lifetime
savings and asset allocation.
How to invest over the life cycle: Insights from theory 241
Table 2 Model overview
Authors Objectives Main model features Main results
Benzoni et al. (2005) Build model that matches emp.
data on equity hold. and stock
market partic. by incorpor.
cointegration of labor inc. and
stock returns
Cont. time model w/ cointe-
grated lab. inc. and stock re-
turns
Young investors not invest-
ed in equities before age 30,
then subproport. incr. of equity
share to 50% upon ret.
Campbell et al. (2000) Compare ret. savings systems
w/ diff. inv. risk characteristics,
under borrowing and stock
market partic. constraints
Illiquid ret. savings account
under altern. asset allocation
regimes, fixed cost of stock
market partic.
Welfare gains from equity in-
vestm. in ret. acc. if contr. rate
is reduced, high partic. and
cond. equity shares dur. life
Campbell/Viceira
(2002)
Illustrate life cycle models Same as CCGM except ret.
acc. inv. riskfree; no partic.
cost
–
Cocco (2004) Study implications of endoge-
nous housing on portfolio
choice in life cycle setting
Housing cons. and ownership
possible, mortage avlbl.
Equity share pos. corr. with fi-
nancial net worth and mortage
debt, share incr. during work-
ing life
Cocco et al. (2005) Study effects of heterog. unin-
sureable labor income and util-
ity costs of suboptimal portfo-
lio rules
Various forms of income
shocks, stochast. and non
stoch. ret. inc.
Baseline: equity share 100%
for ages 25–40, decrease to
50% at 65, slight incr. during
ret., substantial welfare costs
of suboptimal portf. strat.
Davis et al. (2004) Study effects of diff. borrow-
ing regimes, build model that
matches unsecured debt hold-
ings and equity shares in emp.
data
Features borrowing, at rates
higher than riskfree rate
Predicts more realistic life cy-
cle profiles for borrowing and
equity as fractions of income
Gomes/Michaelides
(2003)
Study effects of internal addi-
tive and ratio habit formation
preferences
Additive and altern. ratio habit
formation preferences
Equity share close to 100%
throughout life
Gomes/Michaelides
(2005)
Match empirical fact of low
stock market participation and
low cond. equity shares
Epstein Zin preference hetero-
geneity
With heterog. preferences:
matches emp. life cycle partic.
rates, slightly overestimates
equity share among the young
Gomes et al. (2004) Study welfare effects of tax
deferred ret. accounts (TDA),
portfolio choice in presence of
TDA‘s, with population of di-
rect and indirect stockholders
Epstein Zin preferences, tax-
able and tax deferred ret. acc.,
direct/indirect stockholders
Welfare gains from TDA large
for inv. w/ high RA, strong
savings incent. of employer
matching for high RA-HH, low
welfare cost of fixed contrib.
rate if it is HH spec.
Lynch/Tan (2004) Build model that matches emp.
data on equity hold. and stock
market partic. by incorpor. pre-
dictab. of labor inc. growth
Advanced labor inc. dynamics:
dividend yield as bussiness cy-
cle predictor, risky ass. ret. and
div. yield modelled as VAR
High non-partic. among
young, hump-shaped, inte-
rior age-equity profiles, low
equity holdings among poor
young, equity share incr. in
wealth/income ratio
Polkovnichenko
(2004)
Study effects of internal ad-
ditive habit formation prefer-
ences
Additive habit formation pref-
erences
With disaster state of lab.
inc.: hump shaped age-equity
profiles, equity share incr. in
wealth
Roussanov (2004) Study effects of endog. illiquid
human wealth on dyn. portfo-
lio choice
Investor has option to invest in
human capital once
Hump-shaped age-equity pro-
files, high equity share predict-
ed for poor young investors
Willen (2003) Build model that predicts low
portfolio diversification in en-
trepreneurial HH as obs. in em-
pirical data
Features an entrepr. asset with
stochast. return, secured and
unsecured borrowing
Realistic treatment of credit
markets leads to real. predict.
of portf. of entrepr. HH
Yhao/Zhang (2005) Study effects of housing
ownership and rental market
on dyn. portfolio choice, esti-
mate utility cost of simplifying
assumption “housing only” or
“renting only”
Feature house renting and
ownership, with rich dynamics
Interior, hump-shaped equity
hold., “renting only”: max wel-
fare cost 8% of current wealth,
portf. share upward biased,
“owning only” max. welfare
cost 25% of curr. wealth, portf.
downward biased
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However, a shortcoming of the “fitting” ambition prevailing in the literature
is that it tends to lose normative ground because it does not provide construc-
tive life-cycle investment advice for private investors. Campbell (2006) shows that
a minority of households, particularly those with less education, actually make in-
vestment choices which almost surely do not maximize their welfare. To get these
investors to change their behaviour, it seems important to offer insight from models
thoroughly adapted to the specific household situation. These models should adopt
a normative approach, which means that the assumptions should fit household
characteristics, but model parameters should not be “fitted” to the current portfo-
lio structures. The latter kind of “fitting”, which is characteristic for the positive
approach, should only be carried out if there is reason to believe that actual and
welfare-maximizing behaviour of sample households coincide. In future research,
it seems important to find ways to separate these different types of investors and
to adopt a positive or normative approach accordingly.
Another shortcoming of the literature is that all models are set in partial equi-
librium, i.e. asset returns and earnings processes or wage rates are not determined
endogenously. However, partial equilibrium might not suffice when evaluating wel-
fare consequences of policy proposals in applied work, e.g. in the field of retirement
provision.
We thus see the following future perspectives for the branch of research adressed
in this paper: first, there is a tendency to integrate life-cyle models into large scale
models with aggregate demand and supply features or into a general equilibrium
analysis. For example, Cerny et al. (2005) analyse the impact of demographic
changes and various pension reform proposals on the demand for housing and
financial assets in the UK. In their model, the investor solves a life-cycle problem
similar to those presented here, but embedded in an aggregate OLG model.
Second, several recent models can explain some or even all of the stylized
empirical findings on household portfolio choice.43 As the models are partially
competing, this could create an increased interest in methods to identify them
empirically as well as in ways to assess and compare their ‘goodness of fit’. In the
consumption literature, the method of simulated moments is often used in related
exercises. For this method to be applicable to the estimation of problems similar to
those reviewed here, however, two conditions need to be fulfilled: on the one hand,
improved and richer micro data sets are required and on the other hand, methods are
needed to overcome the computational burden associated with simulated method
of moments estimators in situations where it is prohibitively time-consuming to
generate data from the economic model, as is the case with elaborate dynamic
programming problems like those reviewed here.
Third, we see scope for a move of the literature to normative reasoning and to
providing life-cycle investment advice for private investors. The results obtained so
far call for a more accurate and detailed analysis of individual and household labor
income dynamics. Several questions are immediately apparent, such as: Which
features of labor income differ across investors? How do these differences affect
life cycle portfolio choice? Can we catalogue stylized features of labor income
processes together with the implied optimal portfolio behaviour? To establish such
a taxonomy of labor income features, it will be necessary to have a closer empirical
look at the labor income process. Analyses of the correlation patterns between
43 See Yao and Zhang (2005), Lynch and Tan (2004) and Benzoni et al. (2005).
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labor income and various assets’ return processes as well as potential cointegration
structures (in the spirit of Lynch and Tan (2004) and Benzoni et al. (2005)) are of
eminent interest. This points to the importance of empirical labor economics for
life-cycle portfolio choice and suggests a closer collaboration between researchers
in the fields of financial and labor economics in the future. Ultimately, this research
could then enable us to better understand how investors should behave, why their
behavior might look puzzling and where they might actually be wrong.
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